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Dialog partners coordinate with each other to reach a common goal.The analogy with other
joint activities has sparked interesting observations (e.g., about the norms governing turn-
taking) and has informed studies of linguistic alignment in dialog. However, the parallels
between language and action have not been fully explored, especially with regard to the
mechanisms that support moment-by-moment coordination during language use in con-
versation. We review the literature on joint actions to show (i) what sorts of mechanisms
allow coordination and (ii) which types of experimental paradigms can be informative of the
nature of such mechanisms. Regarding (i), there is converging evidence that the actions
of others can be represented in the same format as one’s own actions. Furthermore, the
predicted actions of others are taken into account in the planning of one’s own actions. Sim-
ilarly, we propose that interlocutors are able to coordinate their acts of production because
they can represent their partner’s utterances. They can then use these representations to
build predictions, which they take into account when planning self-generated utterances.
Regarding (ii), we propose a new methodology to study interactive language. Psycholin-
guistic tasks that have traditionally been used to study individual language production are
distributed across two participants, who either produce two utterances simultaneously or
complete each other’s utterances.
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INTRODUCTION
The interactive use of language in conversation is a form of joint
activity, in which individuals act together to achieve the common
goal of communicative success. Clark (1996, 2002) proposed that
conversation shares fundamental features with other joint activi-
ties, for example waltzing, playing a duet, or shaking hands. The
most central, deﬁning feature of all joint activities is coordination:
themutual process bywhich actors take into account the intentions
and the (performed or to-be-performed) actions of their partners
in the planning and performance of their own actions (Clark,
1996, pp. 61–62). Clark regards the process by which individual
actors manage to coordinate to be a form of problem solving, and
his focus is on “strategies” that they use to attain coordination.
Despite the recognition that co-actors need to coordinate both
on content (the common intended goal) and on processes (“the
physical and mental systems they recruit in carrying out those
intentions”; Clark, 1996, p. 59) to succeed in a joint action, very
little is in fact said about such processes. To illustrate this point,
we look at two aspects of coordination in language use: the syn-
chronization of the processes of production and comprehension,
and turn-taking.
First, production and comprehension never occur in isolation,
but the speaker’s act of production unfolds while the listener com-
prehends it. In order to reach mutual understanding, they need to
process linguistic (and non-linguistic) signals as they occur, while
monitoring for errors and misunderstandings, and usually com-
pensating for a fair amount of noise present in the environment.
Clark (1996, 2002) argued that speaker and listener synchronize
their acts of production and comprehension by striving to comply
with principles such as the continuity principle, which states that
constituents should beproducedﬂuentlywhenever possible (Clark
and Wasow, 1998). When they have to deviate from these princi-
ples, they follow conventional strategies to help their listeners by
signaling that one of the principles is being violated. For exam-
ple, Clark (2002) assumes that speakers produce certain types of
disﬂuencies to inform listeners that they are violating the conti-
nuity principle. But he is silent on the mechanisms that normally
allow synchronization, merely pointing out that the listener needs
to attend to a speaker’s productions.
Second, speakers and listeners take turns by repeatedly switch-
ing roles in the conversation. This alternation is managed “on the
ﬂy” by the participants themselves, at least in informal conversa-
tions (Sacks et al., 1974; Clark, 1996). Transitions are so smooth
that the average gap between turns ranges from approximately
0 ms to around 500 ms (De Ruiter et al., 2006; Stivers et al., 2009),
depending on language and culture. This tight temporal coordi-
nation is coupled with coordination at the pragmatic level, since
each contribution normally constitutes an appropriate response
to a previous contribution by the other speaker. Coordination is
thought to result from the application of a set of norms, which
govern turn transitions and state who can claim the ground and
when (Sacks et al., 1974). It is also recognized that the listener
anticipates the end of the speaker’s turn (Sacks et al., 1974; Clark,
1996, 2002); additionally, the listener starts planning her utterance
in advance, while the previous speaker’s turn is still unfolding.
A widespread claim in the literature on turn-taking is that
speakers help their addressees by signaling whether they want to
keep the ﬂoor or are about to end their turn (Clark, 2002). Many
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linguistic (e.g., pitch contour) and non-linguistic (e.g., breath-
ing) cues are reliably associatedwith turn-holding or turn-yielding
points in a conversation. However, very few studies have systemat-
ically investigated which features of the speech signal are actually
exploited by listeners to discriminate between end-of-turn and
turn-holding points (see Gravano and Hirschberg, 2011; Hjal-
marsson, 2011) and even fewer studies have looked at listeners’
ability to use such cues on-line to anticipate turn endings (Gros-
jean and Hirt, 1996; De Ruiter et al., 2006; Magyari and De Ruiter,
2008). Moreover, no mechanisms have been proposed to explain
how listeners can simultaneously comprehend what the speaker is
saying, use the available cues to predict when the speaker’s turn is
going to end, and prepare their own contribution.
Another important approach to conversation as a joint activ-
ity has developed the study of coordination from a quite different
perspective. Two conversational partners tend to unconsciously
coordinate their body postures (Shockley et al., 2003) and gaze pat-
terns (e.g., Richardson and Dale, 2005; see Shockley et al., 2009).
One way of explaining such ﬁndings is based on the properties of
oscillators, systems characterized by a periodic cycle. Mechanical
oscillators (e.g., pendulums) tend to spontaneously attune their
cycles, so that they become entrained: their cycles come into phase
(or anti-phase). Neural populations ﬁring at certain frequencies
might act as oscillators, and sensory information regarding the
phase of another oscillator (e.g., in another human body) could
serve to ﬁne-tune them. The entrainment of oscillators is therefore
an automatic coordinative mechanism. According to this account,
coordination, in the form of synchronization, emerges from the
interaction of two dynamic systems, without any need for inten-
tions. This view therefore suggests that coordination need not be
goal-directed (Richardson et al., 2005; Shockley et al., 2009; Riley
et al., 2011).
The entrainment of oscillators might explain the remarkable
timing skills shown by language users. Wilson and Wilson (2005)
proposed that such entrainment accounts for speakers’ ability to
avoid gaps or overlaps in conversation. In their account, the pro-
duction system of a speaker oscillates with a syllabic phase: the
readiness to initiate a new syllable is at a minimum in the middle
of a syllable and peaks half a cycle after syllable offset. They argued
the interlocutors converge on the same syllable rate, but their pro-
duction systems are in anti-phase, so that the speaker’s readiness
to speak is at minimum when the listener’s is at a maximum, and
vice versa. Cummins (2003, 2009) found that two people can read
the same text aloud with almost perfect synchrony; his partici-
pants only reviewed the text once and, even without any practice,
could easily maintain average lags as short as 40–60 ms (Cummins,
2003). This timing is impressive, considering the huge amount of
variability in speech, even within one speaker. Cummins (2009)
tentatively suggested that the production systems of synchronous
readers become entrained.
However, the oscillator model cannot fully explain turn-
taking. First, regularities in speech appear to take place over very
short time-scales, with the cyclic pattern of syllables that Wil-
son and Wilson (2005) propose as the basis for entrainment
occurring at 100–150 ms. If predictions were made on the basis
of syllable-level information alone, there would simply be not
enough time to prepare the next contribution and leave a 0-ms
gap. Anticipation of the end of a turn, instead, must draw on
information that spans units larger than the syllable. Thus there
must be additional mechanisms underlying coordination between
interlocutors. In addition, Wilson and Wilson’s account cannot
explain how entrainment of oscillators might lead to mutual
understanding.
More generally, accounts within this framework can only
explain instances of rhythmic, highly repetitive activities. As such,
they have no explanation for the pragmatic link between two com-
plementary actions, be they turns in a conversation or the acts
of handing over a mug and pouring coffee in it. Consider, for
example, how answers complement questions. For an addressee to
produce an appropriate answer, it is not enough to talk in anti-
phase with the speaker. She must be able to plan in advance not
only when to start speaking, but also what to say (Sebanz and
Knoblich, 2009; Vesper et al., 2010).
Clark’s (1996, 2002) approach and the entrainment of oscilla-
tors clearly deal with separate levels of analysis. Clark describes the
dynamics of coordination at what we might call the “intentional”
level. Interlocutors coordinate by making inferences about the
intentions underlying their partners’ behavior. Ultimately, coor-
dination is successful if they develop mutual beliefs about their
intentions. In this, they are helped by the existence of conventions
(e.g., turn-allocation norms) that map intentions onto behav-
ior. On the other hand, the entrainment-of-oscillators approach
focuses on the behavioral patterns exhibited by two coordinat-
ing systems. It maintains that very general physical principles
can explain the emergence of such patterns. Importantly, recent
reviews (Knoblich et al., 2011) and computational accounts (Pez-
zulo andDindo,2011) have emphasized that successful joint action
is likely to require coordination at both a higher level (intentions)
and a lower level (bodily movements). We argue that one needs an
intermediate level of analysis. In essence, it is at this level that one
can deﬁne a cognitive architecture for coordination. This should
comprise a set of mechanisms (representations and processes act-
ing on those representations) that underlie coordination and,
ultimately, mutual understanding between interlocutors.
In this paper,we propose that themost promisingway of identi-
fying these mechanisms stems from a mechanistic account of lan-
guage processing. This is of course what psycholinguistic theories
have traditionally tried to develop. However, most of these theo-
ries are concerned with monolog, in which speakers and listeners
act in isolation. Pickering and Garrod (2004) pointed out the need
for a theory of dialog that can explain the seemingly effortless,
automatic nature of conversation. They proposed that interlocu-
tors come to a mutual understanding via a process of alignment,
whereby their representational states tend to converge during the
course of a conversation. Alignment occurs at many different lev-
els, including words and semantics (Garrod and Anderson, 1987),
syntax (Branigan et al., 2000), and ultimately the situation model.
Importantly, they argued that the simple mechanism of prim-
ing (i.e., facilitation in processing of an item due to having just
processed the same or a related item) underlies such alignment.
Alignment facilitates coordination (i.e., similar representational
states facilitate successful interaction). In their model, therefore,
coordination among interlocutors results from a mechanism of
priming that is known to operate within the individual speaker’s
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production system and the individual listener’s comprehension
system.
To account for alignment between speaker and listener, Picker-
ing and Garrod (2004) assumed representational parity between
production and comprehension. Menenti et al. (2011) recently
provided evidence for this assumption in an fMRI study, show-
ing that brain areas that support semantic, lexical, and syntactic
processing are largely shared between language production and
language comprehension. In another fMRI study, Stephens et al.
(2010) compared activation in a speaker with activation in listen-
ers attending to the speech produced by that speaker. The speaker’s
and the listeners’ neural activity were not only spatially overlap-
ping, but also temporally coupled. As might be expected, areas of
the listeners’ brains were typically activated with some delay rel-
ative to the corresponding areas of the speaker’s brain. However,
some areas showed the opposite pattern: they were activated in
the listener’s brain before they were in the speaker’s. These areas
might be responsible for anticipatory processing of the sort that
seems to be necessary for coordination. The size of areas showing
anticipatory activity was positively correlated with listeners’ com-
prehension performance. Interestingly, Noordzij et al. (2009) also
found extensive overlap when comparing the planning and recog-
nition of non-conventional communicative actions (e.g., moving
a token to communicate its goal position on a game board). If
the production and comprehension systems make use of the same
representations, those representations that have just been built in
comprehension can be used again in production and vice versa.
Because interlocutors alternate between production and compre-
hension, their production and comprehension systems become
increasingly attuned.
However, it is not certain that representational parity can by
itself account for coordination in dialog. In addition to a com-
mon format for the representation of self-generated and other-
generated actions (Sebanz et al., 2006a), addressees need to predict
speakers’utterances (Pickering and Garrod, 2007) and make use of
these predictions when producing their own utterances (Garrod
and Pickering, 2009). To show this, the next section ﬁrst reviews
evidence that representational parity holds between perception
and action. We show how perception–action links can serve as a
basis for prediction of others’ actions and explain how these pre-
dictions can in turn affect the planning of one’s own actions. Then
we apply these ideas speciﬁcally to the coordination of utterances.
As well as outlining a theoretical framework, we describe some
experimental paradigms that can help answer the questions raised
by this new approach. In fact, we believe that the inadequacy
of the current accounts is partly due to the limitations associ-
ated with current experimental studies of dialog. These studies
have traditionally looked at how coordination is achieved off-line,
over quite long stretches of conversation, using measures such as
changes in turn length or choice of referring expressions. Under
these circumstances, time constraints are loose enough to allow for
relatively slow and intentional cognitive processes to be the basis
of coordination (e.g., Clark andWilkes-Gibbs, 1986;Wilkes-Gibbs
and Clark, 1992). Studies that focus on alignment have reduced
the time-scale to consecutive utterances. Garrod and Anderson
(1987), for example, analyzed the spatial descriptions produced
during a co-operative maze game. They showed that interlocutors
align locally on the method of description that they use to refer to
locations in the maze. Studies of priming in dialog have system-
atically investigated this utterance-to-utterance alignment. Thus,
Branigan et al. (2000) had participants alternate in the descrip-
tion of pictures and found that the addressee tends to re-use the
syntactic structure of the description produced by the current
speaker, in the following turn. However, this is still a relatively
long time-scale.
In contrast, no study has looked at that moment-by-moment
coordination that might explain how listeners and speakers syn-
chronize and take turns with virtually no gap or overlap. We argue
that the obvious way to do this would be to conduct experiments
withmore thanoneparticipant inwhich the relative timingof their
contributions is carefully controlled and the relationship between
their utterances is systematically varied. We would then be able
to test whether aspects of others’ utterances are indeed predicted
and to what extent such predictions are taken into account when
planning one’s own utterances. Importantly, these experiments
should focus on the study of mechanistic processes (rather than
intentional behavior), and should in this respect be similar to the
psycholinguistics of monolog.
REPRESENTING ANOTHER’S ACTIONS
The behavioral and neuroscientiﬁc literature on joint actions has
investigated how actions performed by a co-actor are taken into
account in the planning and performance of one’s own actions
(Sebanz et al., 2006a; Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009). Sebanz and
colleagues have argued that acting together requires shared repre-
sentations. This means that people should represent other people’s
actions alongside their own. In a series of experiments, they
demonstrated that such representations are indeed formed and
activated automatically, even when they are not relevant for one’s
own actions because the two participants are merely acting next
to each other on alternating trials (as opposed to acting together
to reach a common goal; Sebanz et al., 2003, 2005; see also Atmaca
et al., 2008; Vlainic et al., 2010).
For example, when one participant is instructed to respond to
red stimuli with right button presses and the other responds to
green stimuli with left button presses (joint condition), reaction
times are slower when the stimulus and the response are spa-
tially incongruent (e.g., the red stimulus points to the left) than
when they are congruent. A similar interference effect arises when
a single participant is in charge of both responses (individual
condition; Sebanz et al., 2003, 2005). In the individual condi-
tion, the irrelevant spatial feature of the stimulus automatically
activates the spatially congruent response, which is part of the
participant’s response set. In the joint condition, there is only one
response in each participant’s response set. However, the partner’s
task is represented as well; the presentation of a leftward-pointing
stimulus automatically evokes the partner’s response (left button
press) as well as one’s own (right button press), yielding interfer-
ence. Additionally, electrophysiological evidence suggests that the
action associated with the partner’s task is inhibited on no-go tri-
als (Sebanz et al., 2006b). In these experiments, knowledge about
the partner’s task is available from the start (i.e., both participants
listen while task instructions for each co-actor are given) and can
be used to predict the partner’s action response even when there is
www.frontiersin.org November 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 275 | 3
Gambi and Pickering The coordination of utterances
no sensory feedback from the other’s actions (Atmaca et al., 2008;
Vlainic et al., 2010); seeing the associated stimulus is enough to
activate the appropriate response (Sebanz et al., 2006a).
When knowledge about others’ actions is not available as part
of a task speciﬁcation, the mere observation of actions performed
by others can still lead to the formation of shared representations
(Sebanz et al., 2006a). More precisely, the action system might
be involved in action observation. At least two lines of evidence
support this claim. First, observing an action that is incompat-
ible with a planned action affects execution of that action (e.g.,
Brass et al., 2000; see Wilson and Knoblich, 2005); second, areas of
the motor system involved in action planning are activated during
passive observation of the same actions (e.g., Iacoboni et al., 1999;
see Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004 for a review). This suggests that
observed actions are coded in the same format as one’s own actions
(Prinz, 1997; Sebanz et al., 2006a).
Many researchers agree that motor involvement in action per-
ception can aid action understanding (e.g., Blakemore and Decety,
2001; Buccino et al., 2004). Wilson and Knoblich (2005) proposed
that action perception involves covert imitation of others’ actions,
as the perceiver internally simulates the observed action in her
own motor system. The simulation is quicker than the actual per-
formance of an action. Therefore, it can also be used to formulate
perceptual predictions aboutwhat the observed actor is going to do
next. Such predictions allow rapid and effective interpretation of
the observed movement, even in cases where the movement needs
to be partially reconstructed, because perceptual information is
missing (predictions would serve to “ﬁll in the gaps”). In addition,
covert imitation of the partner in a joint activity could underlie
quick and appropriate reactions to his or her actions (Wilson and
Knoblich, 2005, p. 468).
More speciﬁcally, Wilson and Knoblich (2005) proposed that
covert imitation of others is based on a model of one’s own body
(cf. Grush, 2004). Though this model can be adjusted to accom-
modate differences between the observer’s and the actor’s bodies,
it follows that simulation (and hence prediction) of one’s own
actions should be more accurate than simulation of actions per-
formed by others. In support of this claim, people are better at
predicting a movement trajectory (e.g., in dart-throwing or hand-
writing) when watching a video of themselves vs. others (Knoblich
and Flach, 2001; Knoblich et al., 2002) and pianists ﬁnd it easier to
synchronize with a recording of themselves than with a recording
of somebody else (Keller et al., 2007).
The model that computes predictions is speciﬁcally a forward
model (Wilson and Knoblich, 2005). It takes a copy of the motor
command sent to the body as input and produces the expected
sensory feedback as output. Expected sensory consequences of
executing a motor command (e.g., expected limb position) can
then be compared with actual feedback coming from the sen-
sory system. This mechanism allows for fast, on-line control of
movements (Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001). If the actual position
of a limb, for example, does not match the predicted position,
adjustments can be made to the motor command to minimize
the difference. When the forward model is run, activation of the
motor system normally ensues. However,when the forward model
is used to covertly imitate another actor, covert imitation does not
always result in overt imitation of another’s movements. It is likely
that the overt motor response is suppressed in such cases (Grush,
2004; Sebanz et al., 2006b).
Finally, and again following Sebanz et al. (2006a), we note that
representing the actions performed by others and predicting what
they are going to do are necessary but not sufﬁcient for on-line
coordination. What is also required is a mechanism for integrat-
ing self-generated and other-generated actions in real time. If
individual actions are coordinated to the partner’s actions on a
moment-by-moment basis, then other-generated actions must be
considered during planning of one’s own actions. In support of
this, Knoblich and Jordan (2003) had participants coordinate but-
ton presses that caused a circular stimulus to accelerate either to
the right or to the left (with each participant being in charge of one
direction) so that the stimulus remained aligned with a moving
dot. Provided that feedback about the other’s actions was available,
participants mastered the task as successfully as participants act-
ing alone. In particular, they learned to jointly anticipate sudden
changes in the dot’s movement direction.
The authors concluded that the participantswere predicting the
consequences of integrating their own and their partner’s actions
and suggested two mechanisms that could underlie this ability.
Participants might run multiple simulations corresponding to the
combination of the various action alternatives available to them-
selves and their partners (cf. Wilson and Knoblich, 2005). The
other alternative, which they favored (Knoblich and Jordan, 2003;
Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009), is based on the distal coding theory
(Prinz, 1997; Hommel et al., 2001), which states that actions are
coded in terms of the events resulting from them. Integration of
self- and other-generated actions could occur at the level of these
distal events. Rather than building and constantly updating a sim-
ulation of other-generated actions, then, people would simply take
into account the perceptual consequences of others’ actions (the
events potentially resulting from them), in the same way as they
would take into account other aspects of the environment (e.g., the
presence of obstacles; cf. Sebanz and Knoblich, 2009, p. 361). One
would then adjust one’s own action plan accordingly, so that the
intended event (corresponding to the joint action goal) is realized.
To summarize, the shared representational approach maintains
that (i) other-generated and self-generated actions are represented
in the same format, (ii) representations of other-generated actions
can be used to drive predictions, and (iii) self-generated and
other-generated actions are integrated in real time to achieve
coordination (Sebanz et al., 2006a). By referring to representa-
tions and processes that make use of those representations, the
account provides explanations at a level that bridges purely inten-
tional and purely mechanistic accounts of coordination. Despite
the above-mentioned limitations (see Introduction), entrainment
of oscillators could still play an important role in coordination. In
particular, it could serve as a basis to optimize other mechanisms
(Vesper et al., 2010).Recall that covert imitationof other-generated
actions is assumed to exploit a model of one’s own body. If some
basic properties of this system, such as the frequency of rhyth-
mic unintentional movements, become attuned via entrainment,
then simulations of another’s actions would likely become more
accurate, because the simulated system will end up sharing fea-
tures of the system on which simulations are based. In accord with
this view, co-actors that rocked chairs in synchrony were faster at
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jointly moving a ball through a labyrinth (Valdesolo et al., 2010).
Therefore, entrainment with another actor can enhance perfor-
mance on a subsequent, unrelated joint task. Entrained actors did
feel more similar to each other and more connected, but these feel-
ings did not predict performance. Instead, enhancement appeared
to be mediated by increased perceptual sensitivity to each other’s
actions (Valdesolo et al., 2010).
REPRESENTING ANOTHER’S UTTERANCES
In this section, we propose that interlocutors also coordinate via
three mechanisms: (i) they represent others’ utterances in a similar
format as their own utterances; (ii) they use these representations
as a basis for prediction; and (iii) they integrate self- and other-
representations on-line. Interestingly, there is plenty of evidence
for a direct link between speech perception and speech produc-
tion (Scott et al., 2009). Fowler et al. (2003) showed that people
are faster at producing a syllable in response to hearing the same
syllable than in response to a tone; in fact, shadowing a sylla-
ble yielded response latencies that were nearly as fast as those
found when the to-be-produced syllable was ﬁxed and known in
advance. Moreover, Kerzel and Bekkering (2000) demonstrated an
action perception compatibility effect for speech (due to a task-
irrelevant stimulus). They found that participants pronounced a
printed syllable while watching a video of a mouth producing the
same syllable more quickly than when the mouth produced a dif-
ferent syllable. While the ﬁrst study involves intentional imitation,
the second one provides more compelling evidence for automatic-
ity. However, they both deal with cases of overt imitation, where
there is an overt motor response. Evidence that bears more on
the issue of covert imitation comes from neuropsychological stud-
ies of speech perception. These studies found activation of motor
areas during passive listening to speech (e.g., Wilson et al., 2004),
showed that this activation is articulator-speciﬁc (Pulvermüller
et al., 2006), and found that stimulation of motor areas with TMS
can inﬂuence speech perception (Meister et al., 2007; D’Ausilio
et al., 2009; see Pulvermüller and Fadiga, 2010).
In addition, some researchers have proposed that activation of
motor areas during speech perception might reﬂect the dynamics
of forward models. In Guenther and colleagues’ model of speech
production, a forward model is used to compute the auditory
representation corresponding to the current shape of the vocal
tract,which in turn is derived from combined proprioceptive feed-
back and a copy of the motor command sent to the articulators
(e.g., Guenther et al., 2006). In an MEG study, Tian and Poep-
pel (2010) demonstrated that auditory cortex is activated very
quickly (around 170 ms) when participants are asked to imagine
themselves articulating a syllable. They therefore proposed that
forward models involved in speech production can be decoupled
from the movement of the articulators. Their ﬁndings open up the
possibility that a forward model of the articulation system could
be used in covert imitation of perceived speech.
Activation of motor areas during speech perception could serve
a variety of purposes. First, it could help understanding, just as it
may for other actions (see Representing Another’s Actions). In
support of this, overt imitation of an unfamiliar accent (which
must of course involve activation of such areas) improves accent
comprehension more than mere listening (Adank et al., 2010).
Alternatively, it could reﬂect articulatory rehearsal in the verbal
working memory system (Wilson, 2001). Scott et al. (2009) sug-
gested that motoric activation during speech perception might
also facilitate coordination between language users in dialog. In
particular, they proposed that the activation of the motor system
underlies synchronization of the rhythmic properties of speech
(entrainment). Our proposal differs in that we claim that it could
also be responsible for the covert imitation, and prediction, of
others’ utterances (Pickering and Garrod, 2007).
WHAT KIND OF INFORMATION IS REPRESENTED?
Consider two speakers, A (female) and B (male), producing two
utterances roughly at the same time, in response to a shared stimu-
lus, such as a to-be-named picture of a kite. Figure 1 illustrates the
range of information that A could represent about her own utter-
ance (upper box) and about B’s utterance (lower box). Before we
discuss the nature of these representations,we will brieﬂy illustrate
the time course of wordproduction, takingA’s productionof“kite”
as an example (see the timeline at the top of Figure 1). Models of
single word production (e.g., Levelt et al., 1999) involve at least
(i) a semantic representation (semA) corresponding to the target
concept (KITE); (ii) a syntactic representation (synA) – sometimes
called a lemma– that incorporates syntactic information about the
lexical item, such as that it is a noun (kite(N)); (iii) a phonological
representation (phonA) that speciﬁes a sequence of phonemes and
its syllable structure (/kaIt/). Finally, the appropriate articulatory
gestures are retrieved and executed (artA).
Note that each processing level is characterized not only by the
content of the associated representation, but also by its timing
[t(semA), t(synA), etc.]. Some representations are typically ready
before others and the processing stages take different amounts of
time. Indefrey and Levelt (2004) derived indicative time windows
from a meta-analysis of several word production experiments.
Their estimates are also reported at the top of Figure 1, though
the exact times might depend on the words used or the experi-
mental conditions (cf. Sahin et al., 2009, for estimates based on
intracranial electrophysiological recordings).
Now, consider the upper box of Figure 1. We assume that A can
generate predictive estimates of the duration of each processing
stage (indicated by tˆ in Figure 1). For example, she might generate
the estimate tˆ (synA) ≈250 ms, meaning that she predicts retriev-
ing the syntactic representation will take approximately 250 ms
(from picture onset). These estimates can in turn be exploited
by A to guide planning of her own utterance. Interestingly, some
studies have shown that individual speakers can coordinate the
production of two successive utterances so as to minimize dis-
ﬂuencies (Grifﬁn, 2003; cf. Meyer et al., 2007). Similarly, Meyer
et al. (2003) demonstrated that the amount of planning speak-
ers perform before articulation onset can depend on the response
time deadline they implicitly set for their performance at a naming
task. This suggests that timing estimates are computed for one’s
own utterances and can be used to guide planning.
Clearly, for a speaker to be able to use the information pro-
vided by timing estimates effectively, the estimates must be ready
before processing at the corresponding stages is completed. So,
for instance, the estimate tˆ (synA) ≈250 ms is useful only if it is
available before syntactic processing is complete. This means that
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FIGURE 1 | Simultaneous production. A produces the word kite in
response to the picture of a kite. semA , synA , phonA are semantic,
syntactic, and phonological representations for A’s utterance. t(semA ),
t(synA ), t(phonA ) indicate the actual time elapsed from picture onset (in ms)
when processing is completed at each stage and the corresponding
representation has been built (based on Indefrey and Levelt, 2004); t(artA )
marks the onset of A’s utterance. tˆ (semA ), tˆ (synA ), tˆ (phonA ), and tˆ (artA ) are
timing estimates computed by A for her own utterance. pˆ (semA ), pˆ (synA ),
pˆ (phonA ), pˆ (artA ) are the content predictions for A’s own utterance, on
which the timing estimates are based. A believes that B is speaking in
response to the same picture. Dotted lines refer to representations of the
other. tˆ (semB ), tˆ (synB ), tˆ (phonB ), and tˆ (artB ) are timing estimates
computed by A for B’s utterance. pˆ (semB ), pˆ (synB ), pˆ (phonB ), pˆ (artB ) are
A’s content predictions, at the various processing stages, for B’s utterance.
Horizontal arrows [from pˆ (semA ) to tˆ (semA ), from pˆ (synA ) to tˆ (synA ), etc.]
indicate that estimates of the timing at each level are based on content
predictions at the same level. Timing estimates at one level could also be
directly based on content estimates at other levels, but we ignore this here
for simplicity. Vertical arrows from self- and other-predictions to planning
represent the integration stage.
the estimates are predictions. What are such predictions based on?
Importantly, in language production, timing aspects are known to
be closely related to the content of the computed representations.
For example, word frequency affects t(phonA), with phonological
retrieval being slower for less frequent word forms (e.g., Cara-
mazza et al., 2001). We therefore assume that A predicts aspects of
the content of semA , synA , and phonA. In other words, the speaker
anticipates aspects of the semantics, syntax, and phonology of the
utterance she is about to produce, before the representations cor-
responding to each level are built in the course of the production
process itself. To distinguish these predictions that relate to content
from predictions that relate to timing (i.e., the timing estimates),
we label them pˆ (semA), pˆ (synA), pˆ (phonA), and pˆ (artA).
There is much evidence that content predictions of the sort
we are assuming for production are indeed formulated by readers
and listeners during comprehension. For example a series of sen-
tence comprehension studies showed that predictions are made
at the syntactic (lemma) level, in relation to syntactic category
(e.g., Staub and Clifton, 2006) and gender (e.g.,Van Berkum et al.,
2005), and at the phonological level (e.g., DeLong et al., 2005;
Vissers et al., 2006). For a review of some of this evidence, see Pick-
ering and Garrod (2007), who also argued that such predictions
rely on production processes. Note, however, that timing and con-
tent predictions for self-generated utterances need not always be as
detailed as these studies may suggest. The speciﬁcity of predictions
might depend on task demands (e.g.,whether ﬁne-grained control
over the production process is needed) and be highly variable.
Having posited that predictions of timing and content can be
generated for one’s own utterances, we now propose that rep-
resenting others’ utterances can also involve the computation of
predictions, and that those predictions are in a similar format to
the timing and content predictions for self-generated utterances.
The lower (dashed) box in Figure 1 shows the range of infor-
mation that A could represent about B’s utterance. Importantly,
A may well not represent all of this information under all cir-
cumstances. Later, we describe experimental paradigms that can
investigate the conditions under which aspects of B’s utterance are
represented and how. Here, our aim is to provide a comprehensive
framework in which such questions can be addressed.
First of all, A could estimate the time course of B’s production.
Minimally, A could compute tˆ (artB), an estimate of B’s speech
onset latency. In addition, A might compute timing estimates for
the different processing stages, from semantics to phonology [ tˆ
(semB), tˆ (synB), tˆ (phonB), and tˆ (artB) in Figure 1], just as she
does when anticipating the timing of her own productions. As
timing estimates are likely to be based on information regarding
the content of the computed representations,we suggest thatA can
also represent the content of B’s utterance. In particular, A builds
predictive representations of the semantics, syntax, and phonology
of the utterance produced by B [ pˆ (semB), pˆ (synB), pˆ (phonB),
and pˆ (artB) in Figure 1].
THE NATURE OF THE REPRESENTATION OF THE OTHER
We have just proposed that other-generated utterances can be rep-
resented in a format that is similar to that of content (pˆ) and timing
(tˆ) predictions for self-generated utterances. How are such predic-
tions computed? We propose that people can make content and
timing predictions, for both self-generated and other-generated
utterances, using forward models of their own production system.
This, in essence, amounts to an extension of the covert imitation
account (Wilson and Knoblich, 2005) to language. Pickering and
Garrod (submitted) provide a detailed theory that incorporates
these claims (see also Pickering and Garrod, 2007; Garrod and
Pickering, 2009).
The model is primarily used in the planning and control of
one’s own acts (here, speech production acts), but it can be used
to simulate the production system of another speaker. When this
happens, the model is decoupled from the production system, so
that covertly simulating another’s utterances does not lead to the
actual planning of that utterance or to its articulation. In other
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition November 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 275 | 6
Gambi and Pickering The coordination of utterances
words, A does not build semB , synB , and phonB (semantic, syn-
tactic, and phonological representations for the utterance that B is
going to produce) just as she does not initiate artB (the articulation
stage for B’s utterance).
Nevertheless, speakers can overtly imitate a speaker (e.g., in
speech shadowing; see Marslen-Wilson, 1973) and they some-
times complete each other’s utterances (see Pickering and Garrod,
2004). On occasion, therefore, covert simulation of B’s utterance,
via the computation of a forward model, results in activation of
A’s own production system. In this case, there will be activation of
the semantic (semB), syntactic (synB), and phonological (phonB)
representations corresponding to B’s to-be-produced utterance,
within A’s production system. Depending on the predictability of
B’s utterance, and on the speed of the simulation, A might end
up shadowing B’s speech, talking in unison with B or even antic-
ipating a completion for B’s utterance. Note, however, that some
activation of A’s production system does not necessarily entail that
A overtly articulates B’s utterance.
Note that this account differs slightly from thedominant view in
the action and perception literature (e.g., Grush, 2004). According
to this view, the motor system is in fact always activated following
the activation of the forward model, but this activation is inhibited
and therefore does not result in an overt motor response (though
residual muscle activation can be detected in the periphery; e.g.,
Fadiga et al., 2002). The system responsible for language predic-
tion might function in the same way as the system responsible
for motor predictions. However, it is also possible that predict-
ing B’s utterances does not involve any (detectable) activation
ﬂow in A’s language production system. At present, determining
exactly under which conditionsA’s production system is activated,
and to what extent, is still a matter for empirical investigation.
In the section on “Simultaneous Productions” we indicate which
experimental outcomes are to be expected under the alternative
hypotheses.
Another important issue relates to the accuracy of both the
timing and content representations of another’s utterances. For
example, how similar is pˆ (semB) to B’s concept KITE, or how
accurate an estimate of B’s speech onset latency is tˆ (artB)? We
expect representations of another’s utterances to be generally
somewhat inaccurate. First, although context and task instruc-
tions might highly constrain the productions of both speakers in
experimental settings, normally A would have only limited infor-
mation regarding what B intends to say. Second, A has limited
experience of other speakers’ production systems. The forward
model she uses to compute predictive estimates is ﬁne-tuned to
her own production system rather than to B’s production sys-
tem (Wolpert et al., 2003). As a consequence, timing estimates
based on a model of A’s production system are likely to diverge
from the actual time course of B’s production. The degree of
error will also depend on how much B differs from A in speed
of information processing. Conversely, we expect accuracy to
increase the more A’s and B’s systems are or become similar
(Wolpert et al., 2003). In conversations, the two systems might
become increasingly attuned via alignment (Pickering andGarrod,
2004), thanks to priming channels between the production and
comprehension systems of the two interlocutors. Furthermore,
interlocutors’ breathing patterns and speech rates can converge
via entrainment (see Wilson and Wilson, 2005 and references
therein).
Finally, we might ask whether predictions about other-
generated utterances can inﬂuence the planning of one’s own
utterances to the same extent as predictions about self-generated
utterances. For example, say that tˆ (artA) is a prediction of when
A will ﬁnish articulating her current utterance. A should take this
prediction into account as she plans when to start her next utter-
ance. Similarly, if B is the current speaker and A wants to take the
next turn, A could compute tˆ (artB), an estimate of when B will
stop speaking. Then the question is, will A pay as much attention
to tˆ (artB) as she would to tˆ (artA) in the ﬁrst case? This is likely
to depend on the circumstances. For example, tˆ (artB) might be
weighted as less important if its degree of accuracy is low (i.e.,
previous predictions have proved to be wrong). Alternatively, A
might not take tˆ (artB) into account, simply because she does not
share a goal with B; for example, she might be trying hard to be
rude and interrupt B as much as possible.
THE TIME COURSE OF PLANNING, PREDICTION, AND THEIR
INTEGRATION
What is the time course of predictions, both with respect to
one another and to the time course of word production? Firstly,
predictions should be ready before the corresponding produc-
tion representations are retrieved in the process of planning an
utterance. Secondly, since we assumed that timing estimates are
computed on the basis of content predictions, pˆ (semA) should
be ready before tˆ (semA), pˆ (synA) before tˆ (synA), etc. Similarly
for other-predictions, pˆ (semB) should be ready before tˆ (semB),
pˆ (synB) before tˆ (synB), etc. (see horizontal arrows in Figure 1).
However,we intend notmake any speciﬁc claim about the order
in which predictions at the different levels (semantics, syntax, and
phonology) are computed. It might be tempting to stipulate that
the prediction system closely mimics the production system in
this respect. In fact, however, the prediction system is a (forward)
model of the production system and such a model need not imple-
ment all aspects of the internal dynamics of the modeled system.
In particular, the prediction system for language could involve
the same representational levels as the language production sys-
tem, but the time course with which predictions are computed
could differ from the time course of language production. Pre-
dictions at the levels of semantics, syntax, and phonology might
even be computed separately and (roughly) simultaneously (Pick-
ering and Garrod, 2007). In other words there could be separate
mappings from the intention to communicate to semantics, syn-
tax, and phonology. For this reason, in Figure 1 we simply list the
different predictions. Nevertheless, it is certainly the case that pre-
dictions at different levels are related to each other. For example, a
prediction that the upcoming word refers to an object (a seman-
tic prediction) and that it is a noun (a syntactic prediction) are
related (because nouns tend to refer to objects). It is likely that the
prediction system for language exploits such systematic relations
between levels.
Once predictions are computed, how are they integrated in the
process of planning an utterance (cf. vertical arrows in Figure 1)?
To illustrate, take the following situation. The speaker needs
to initiate articulation (artA) rapidly, perhaps because of task
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instructions (in an experiment) or because of an impatient lis-
tener trying to get the ﬂoor. But she also knows that her chosen
word is long (e.g., helicopter). The speaker computes pˆ (phonA),
a prediction of the phonology of the word. On the basis of this,
the speaker estimates, tˆ (phonA), that the complete phonological
representation for that word will take a long time to construct, and
that she will not be able to get it ready before the timeout. The pre-
dicted failure to meet the goal either (i) causes more resources to
be invested in planning to speed things up, or, if processing speed
is already at limit (ii) leads to early articulation of the ﬁrst syllable
of the word, even if the remaining syllables have not been pre-
pared yet (Meyer et al., 2003). In other words, predicted outcomes
(i.e., the output of the forward model) can trigger corrections
to the ongoing planning process, in case such outcomes do not
correspond to the intended goal.
METHODOLOGICAL RATIONALE: COMPARING SELF’s AND
OTHER’s REPRESENTATIONS
How can we test whether the proposed account is correct? First, we
should identify the conditions under which other-representations
are formed. Second, we should investigate the nature of such rep-
resentations. To do so, we need to compare individual production
and joint production (in analogy with the joint action literature;
e.g., Sebanz et al., 2003). In particular, we consider two instances
of joint production: simultaneous productions (see Simultaneous
Productions) and consecutive productions (see Consecutive Pro-
ductions). In both sections,we ﬁrst introduce the rationale behind
joint production tasks and present the model’s general predic-
tions. Then, we describe a few speciﬁc methods in more detail.
These make use of psycholinguistic tasks that (i) have been suc-
cessfully employed in the study of isolated individual production,
and (ii) can be distributed between two participants to study joint
production. After a brief overview of the results typically found
in individual production experiments, we list the speciﬁc predic-
tions that our account makes with regard to the comparison of the
individual and the joint task in each case.
SIMULTANEOUS PRODUCTIONS
Consider two speakers planning two different or similar utterances
at the same time (see Figure 1). If A automatically represents B’s
utterance as well as her own, then her act of production will be
affected by the nature of his utterance, even if there is no need for
coordination; the same holds for B’s representation of A’s utter-
ance. We therefore expect joint simultaneous production to differ
from individual production. By manipulating the relationship
between the two speakers’ utterances (e.g., whether they produce
the same or different utterances), we can further investigate the
nature of A’s representations of B’s utterances.
In particular, if predictions regarding other-generated utter-
ances are computed via a model of one’s production system, it
should be possible to simulate another’s utterances without the
corresponding representations being activated in one’s own pro-
duction system. Additionally, it might be possible to maintain
two models active in parallel (Wolpert et al., 2003; Wilson and
Knoblich, 2005), for one’s own and one’s partner’s utterances.
However, using the same format simultaneously for simulating
oneself and another may well lead to competition (Hamilton et al.,
2004;Wilson and Knoblich, 2005). If so,we expect greater interfer-
ence from B’s utterance on A’s production when A and B perform
the same act of production than when they perform different
acts.
Nevertheless, if (at least partial) activation of A’s own produc-
tion system follows her simulation of B via the forward model,
then we expect representations of B’s utterances to interact with
representations of A’s own utterances in the way that representa-
tions for different self-generated utterances should interact. What
would be the effect of such interaction within A’s production sys-
tem? There might be facilitation or interference, depending on a
variety of factors (e.g., whether B is producing the same word or a
different word; in the latter case,whether the two words are related
in form or meaning; cf. Schriefers et al., 1990).
Besides, since some representations are harder to process than
others, variables that affect processing difﬁculty of self-generated
utterances should also exert an effect in relation to other-generated
utterances. Consider, for instance, the following situation. A and B
name different pictures. The frequency of picture names is varied,
so that on some trialsB produces low-frequencywords,whereas on
others he produces high-frequency words. Given that it is harder
to access the phonological representation of a low-frequency word
than a high-frequency word (cf. Miozzo and Caramazza, 2003),we
predict that representing B’s utterance will interfere more with A’s
naming in the low-frequency condition than the high-frequency
condition. In general, the difﬁculty of B’s task will affect the degree
towhich the representation of B’s utterances affectsA’s production
of her own utterances.
To sumup,paradigms that involve two speakers’simultaneously
or near-simultaneously producing utterances serve two purposes:
they test whether self- and other-generated utterances are rep-
resented in the same way, and they can elucidate the nature of
other-representations, and in particular whether they involve the
activation of one’s own production system. Below we describe two
such paradigms in more detail: joint picture–word interference
and joint picture–picture naming.
Joint picture–word interference
In the classical picture–word interference paradigm (individual
task), naming latencies are affected by the relationship between
the pictures that the participant is required to name and words
superimposed on those pictures. For example, semantically related
distractor words lead to longer latencies than unrelated distractor
words (Schriefers et al., 1990). The task-irrelevant stimulus (word)
is thought to be automatically processed and interfere with the
response to the task-relevant stimulus (picture).
In a joint version of this task, participants take turns to name
the picture and to perform a secondary task, which is either con-
gruent or incongruent with the primary task of picture naming.
One possibility is for the participants to be in the same room,
with the congruent task being tacit naming of the picture and the
incongruent task being tacit naming of the word. Alternatively,
the participants could be in separate and soundproofed rooms,
in which case the secondary task could be overt picture or word
naming. In any case, we would have a SAME condition (congru-
ent secondary task), in which both participants produce the same
utterance (i.e., the picture’s name) and a DIFFERENT condition
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(incongruent secondary task), in which they produce different
utterances (i.e., the picture’s name and the distractor word). If
speakers represent the processes underlying their partners’ acts
of speaking, we expect both the SAME and DIFFERENT condi-
tions to differ from the individual task. If speakers represent the
processes underlying their partners’ response via a forward model,
we expect longer latencies in the SAME than the DIFFERENT con-
dition. If representing the other involves activation of one’s own
production system, on the contrary, we expect faster latencies in
the SAME than in the DIFFERENT condition. In addition,we may
ﬁnd enhanced effects of distractor words on the processing of the
pictures (e.g., greater semantic interference) in the DIFFERENT
condition.
Joint picture–picture naming
In picture–picture naming tasks, participants name a target pic-
ture which is presented in the context of another (distractor)
picture. The distractor picture is either related or unrelated to
the target picture. Unlike picture–word interference experiments,
picture–picture naming experiments typically show no clear effect
of semantically related distractors on target naming latencies (e.g.,
Navarrete and Costa, 2005). In a joint version of the picture–
picture naming task, participants either name one picture or
remain silent. For trials on which the participant is naming a pic-
ture, we vary whether the partner remains silent (NO condition)
or names the same (SAME condition) or a different picture (DIF-
FERENT condition). Assuming that the task-irrelevant picture’s
name is not automatically activated when performing the individ-
ual task, theNOcondition should act as a control. If the participant
represents the fact that her partner is naming a picture, then this
may similarly affect both the SAME and the DIFFERENT condi-
tion; if she represents that her partner is naming a speciﬁc picture,
we predict the SAME and the DIFFERENT condition will differ
from each other. Again, the direction of these effects will depend
on whether or not the production system is implicated in the rep-
resentation of the other (see The Nature of the Representation of
the Other).
CONSECUTIVE PRODUCTIONS
One concern with the study of simultaneous production is that
it is comparatively rare in real conversations. Of course, speak-
ers do occasionally contribute at the same time, for example
when two listeners both claim the ground (e.g., in response to
a question; Wilson and Wilson, 2005) or in intended choral co-
production (e.g., mutual greetings; Schegloff, 2000). But it may be
that speakers do not need a system that is specialized for repre-
senting their own utterance and a simultaneous utterance by their
partner.
In contrast, consecutive production occurs all the time in con-
versation. First, the norm in dyadic conversations is the alternation
of speaking turns. Second, conversational analysts have noted the
occurrence of “collaborative turn completion” (Lerner, 1991). As
illustrated in Example 1 below,B’s act of production completesA’s
act appropriately and with minimum delay (0.1 means 100 ms).
Instances of “collaborative turn completion” are striking, because
twopeople effectively coordinate to jointly deliver onewell-formed
utterance.
1. A: so if one person said he could not invest (0.1)
B: then I’d have to wait
(Lerner,1991,p. 445)
Thus, speakers have much more need of representing their own
utterance and their partner’s upcoming utterance. Consecutive
production paradigms should then somewhat mimic the natu-
ralistic situation exempliﬁed in 1. For example, A and B could be
shown two pictures (e.g., of a wig and of a carrot), one on the right
and one on the left of a computer screen. A ﬁrst names the left pic-
ture (wig ); then B names the right picture (carrot ; see Figure 2A).
They are told to minimize delay between the two names (cf. Grif-
ﬁn, 2003). We therefore create a joint goal for them. This situation
certainly differs from naturally occurring instances of “collabo-
rative turn completion”, but it allows clear experimental control,
and is arguably comparable to using tasks such as picture naming
to understand natural monolog. (In an alternative version of the
task, participants might simply start speaking in response to cues,
which might occur at different times (i.e., SOAs) depending on
condition.)
Figure 2Apresents a schematic description.Given the complex-
ity of the situation, in order to ensure that the ﬁgure is readable,
we illustrate what happens from the perspective of A, the speaker
that names the ﬁrst picture. The timeline at the top shows the time
course of word production for A’s utterance (and the onset of B’s
utterance). Just as for the simultaneous production paradigm, we
assume that A generates timing estimates for her own utterance
and that these estimates are based on content predictions (left
box). In addition, we hypothesize that A represents B’s upcoming
utterance in a similar format and computes timing estimates and
content predictions for that utterance, as well (right box).
To test these hypotheses, we again compare joint tasks with
solo tasks. In the solo task (see Figure 2B), which was ﬁrst used
by Grifﬁn (2003),A produces both pictures’ names, with the same
instruction of avoiding pausing between the two. Clearly, A goes
through all the processing levels for both words and builds repre-
sentations at each level. The timeline at the top of panel B differs
from the one in Figure 1: most notably, t(artA) corresponds to
1200 ms, instead of the 600 ms posited by Indefrey and Levelt
(2004). This reﬂects the ﬁnding that participants tend to delay the
onset of the ﬁrst word, presumably because they perform advance
planning. They start planning the second word before initiating
the articulation of the ﬁrst one (Grifﬁn, 2003). We also assume
that A computes timing estimates and content predictions for the
second word, as well as for the ﬁrst word.
If content and timing predictions computed for B’s utter-
ance in the JOINT condition are similar to those computed for
A’s own second utterance in the SOLO condition, we expect
the JOINT and the SOLO condition to show similar patterns of
results. Of course, we might also expect any effects to be weaker in
the JOINT than in the SOLO condition, if other-representations
are weighted less than self-representations (see The Nature of
the Representation of the Other). We know that the amount of
planning that speakers perform before articulation onset (and,
consequently, speech onset latency) depends on various proper-
ties of the planned material, such as its length (Meyer et al., 2003)
or syntactic complexity (e.g., Ferreira, 1991). Therefore, we expect
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FIGURE 2 | Consecutive utterances: pictures of a wig and a
carrot appear simultaneously. (A) JOINT: A names the left picture,
then B names the right picture. (B) SOLO: A names the left
picture, then A names the right picture. (C) NO: A names the left picture.
Where two utterances are produced, we indicate the temporal relation
between them by way of number subscripts (1 for the ﬁrst utterance, 2 for
the second utterance). In (A) artB2 stands for the articulation stage of B’s
utterance and pˆ (semB2 ) is the semantic content prediction that A
generates in relation to B’s utterance. Time in ms. All other details as in
Figure 1.
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speech onset latencies for the ﬁrst word to be affected by prop-
erties of the second word in the SOLO condition. This would
reﬂect an inﬂuence of predictions of the second word’s features
on the planning of the ﬁrst word. In the JOINT condition, we
predict A’s speech onset will be similarly affected (though per-
haps to a lesser degree), despite the fact that the second word is
actually produced by B. This would show that predictions of the
second word’s features are computed and can affect planning of
the ﬁrst word also when the second word is generated by another
speaker.
Additionally, the JOINT condition could be usefully contrasted
to the NO condition, depicted in Figure 2C. The NO condition is
equivalent to an instance of isolated production of a single word
by A. Importantly, A’s task is the same in the NO and the JOINT
conditions (i.e., producing Utterance 1), the only difference being
that B does not produce Utterance 2 in the NO condition. The
NO condition can therefore act as a control: no effect on onset
latencies is expected.
Below we present various experiments that implement these
ideas and discuss detailed predictions for each. Note that having
the participants perform both roles is advisable, for two reasons.
First, it allows data from both participants in a pair to be col-
lected (therefore also comparisons between the behavior of the
partners). Second, performing B’s task on half of the trials is likely
to maximize the accuracy of A’s estimates of B’s timing.
Joint reversed length-effect
In Grifﬁn’s (2003) study, two pictures appeared simultaneously.
The participant was told to name both pictures, avoiding pauses
between the two names. She found a reversed length-effect: par-
ticipants tended to initiate speech later when the ﬁrst name was
shorter than when it was longer; they also tended to look at the
second picture more prior to speech onset and less after speech
onset. Meyer et al. (2007) reported no effect on speech latencies,
but they showed that the gaze–speech lag for the second picture
was longer when the ﬁrst name was shorter. Overall, these results
seem to suggest that participants can estimate the amount of time
that will be available for preparation of the second name during
the articulation of the ﬁrst name (Grifﬁn, 2003).
We can therefore ask if they also estimate the time that their
partner spends preparing the second name. In the SOLO condi-
tion, one participant names both pictures on a given trial; this
condition is the same as Grifﬁn (2003), except for the fact that
two people are present and take turns in performing the task. In
the NO condition, participants alternate in naming only the ﬁrst
picture, with both partners ignoring the second picture. In the
critical JOINT condition, one participant names the ﬁrst picture,
then the other names the second picture; they alternate in per-
forming either half of the task. We expect B (who has to name the
second picture) to start looking at the second picture earlier (rela-
tive to when A starts speaking) when the ﬁrst name is shorter. This
would show that B is anticipating he will have less time to prepare
his utterance when A is speaking. Besides, we expect A to initiate
shorter words later than longer words. This would show that A is
estimating B’s speech onset latencies and taking this estimate into
account to successfully coordinate with B in producing a ﬂuent
utterance.
A related paradigm is based on Meyer (1996). She showed
that when one participant is asked to name two pictures with a
conjoined noun phrase, the auditory presentation of a distractor
related in meaning to the second name delays onset latencies of
the conjoined phrase. Again, if A contributes the ﬁrst noun and B
the second noun of the conjoined noun phrase and they have to
coordinate to produce a ﬂuent utterance (JOINT condition), we
predict A’s speech will be affected by the relationship between the
distractor and the second noun.
Joint syntactic encoding
The greater the syntactic complexity of the subject of a sentence,
the longer it takes to start uttering the sentence. For example, a
complex subject containing a prepositional phrase modiﬁer or a
relative clause slows down initiation times compared to a sim-
ple subject composed of two conjoined noun phrases, even when
length is controlled for (Ferreira, 1991). The SOLO condition
would be based on Ferreira’s experiments (except for the pres-
ence of two participants): sentences could be ﬁrst memorized and
then produced upon presentation of a “go”-signal. In the JOINT
condition, both participants wouldmemorize the sentences. Then,
depending on the cue presented at the beginning of the trial, either
A or B would produce the subject (e.g.,The bike), while their part-
ner would contribute the rest of the sentence (e.g., was damaged
vs. that the cars ran over was damaged). We expect a syntactic
complexity effect on initiation times of the subject.
Active utterances are also initiated faster than the correspond-
ing passives (Ferreira, 1994). Participants in the SOLO condition
either produce sentences using a set of words provided by the
experimenter or they describe pictures depicting a transitive event
(e.g., of a girl hitting a boy). They are instructed to always start
with the word or character presented in green (the so-called “traf-
ﬁc light” paradigm; Menenti et al., 2011). In this way, it is possible
to control the voice of the sentence (e.g., if the boy is the ﬁrst-
named entity, a passive will be produced, otherwise an active).
In the JOINT condition, participant A names only this ﬁrst entity,
while participantB produces the rest of the sentence.We expectA’s
speech onset latencies to be slower when B produces a passive con-
tinuation than an active continuation; similar (or larger) results
would occur in the SOLO condition, but not in the NO condition.
A related paradigm could compare short vs. long continuations;
it is known that more disﬂuencies are found at the start of longer
constituents (Clark and Wasow, 1998) and it takes longer to start
uttering a sentence when the subject is a conjoined noun phrase
than when it is a simple noun phrase (Smith andWheeldon, 1999).
Shared error-repair
In instances of spontaneous self-repair, people stop speaking
because they detected an error in their speech and then resume
with the intended output. In Hartsuiker et al. (2008), participants
named pictures. On a small percentage of trials, an initial picture
(the error) changed into a target picture (the resumption). Par-
ticipants were told to stop speaking as fast as possible when they
detected the change. In one experiment (Experiment 1), then, the
same participant was asked to resume as fast as possible by nam-
ing the target picture,whereas in another experiment (Experiment
2) the task was simply to stop speaking (Hartsuiker et al., 2008).
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Hartsuiker et al., 2008; see also Tydgat et al., 2011) showed that
the process of stopping and the process of planning the resump-
tion share resources: in Experiment 1, participants took longer
to stop naming the error when the resumption was more difﬁ-
cult (through the target picture being degraded) than when it was
less difﬁcult (through the picture being intact). Moreover, there
is evidence for strategic processing: when a resumption follows,
people tend to withdraw resources from stopping, and instead
invest them in planning the resumption while carrying on speak-
ing. In other words, they prefer to complete the error rather than
to interrupt it right away. A two-person version of Experiment 1
(stopping and resuming) would correspond to the SOLO condi-
tion, whereas a two-person version of Experiment 2 (stopping)
would be our NO condition. In the critical JOINT condition,
A stops, then B resumes. Therefore, A does not contribute the
resumption. However, if she predicts that B will resume,we expect
she will preferentially withdraw resources from stopping and com-
plete the error, even if she does not need to invest these resources
in planning the resumption.
CONCLUSION
After reviewing the literature on joint actions, we identiﬁed
three mechanisms of action coordination: representational parity
between self- and other-generated actions, prediction of observed
actions, and integration of others’ actions into the planning of
one’s own actions.We then claimed that similarmechanisms could
underlie the coordination of utterances. We gave a comprehensive
account of the type of information that could be represented about
another’s utterances. In considering the nature of these representa-
tions,we proposed that they are predictions generated by a forward
model of one’s own production system. Finally, we described two
types of experimental paradigms (simultaneous productions and
consecutive productions) that may prove informative as to the
nature, extent, and accuracy of other-representations.
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